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The controversial Right-Turn-On-Red (R T O R ) at signalized
intersections began in 1937 when some authorities in California became
convinced that motorists making right turns were wasting too much
time waiting for the green traffic signal. These authorities first experi
mented with permitting motorists to make a right turn while facing
a red signal only when a sign was in place allowing such action (per
mission by exception). In 1947 the state of California passed legislation
permitting the R T O R movement at all signalized intersection ap
proaches unless a sign was in place prohibiting the movement (per
mission by rule). In both cases the driver was required to stop first
and yield to pedestrians and other vehicles properly approaching the
intersection.
Since that time, permitting motorists to make a R T O R has spread
gradually throughout the country because of its reduction of traffic
delays and fuel consumption. Table 1 shows the use of R T O R in
several recent years. Due to the different practices in the different states,
the result has been much confusion for the driver as he travelled from
one state to another.

TABLE 1

S T A T E S T H A T U SED R T O R

Permission by rule
Permission by exception
Total exclusion

1972

1974

M id1976

13
19
18

22
20
8

36
14
0*

*The District of Columbia, however, did not permit R T O R in any
form.
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As drivers have increased their area of travel over the years, the need
for uniform standards for traffic control devices has increased. Since
publication of the first edition of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Con
trol Devices (M U T C D ) in 1927, considerable evolution of this stand
ard manual has occurred.
In the 1954 M U T C D , the R T O R maneuver was highly discour
aged because of fear it weakened the clear meaning of the red indication.
Since there was little established evidence to counter the premise that
R T O R might add hazard when permitted, the 1961 M U T C D still
stated that permitting the maneuver was not recommended. The 1971
M U T C D , however, permitted the R T O R but only when a sign was
in place permitting the turn. The driver was required to come to a com
plete stop before making his turn.
In August 1972 the National Highway Traffic Safety Administra
tion (N H T S A ) proposed in the Federal Register that all states would
be required to enact legislation to permit the R T O R maneuver at all
locations unless a sign was in place prohibiting the turn.5 A t that time
many traffic authorities objected to this method of revising the uniform
control device standards. Finally, permitting the R T O R maneuver by
rule was incorporated in July 1975 into the Uniform Vehicle Code,
another national standard developed by the National Committee on
Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances to establish consistent traffic
laws throughout the country.
In Indiana, R T O R has been permitted by sign for many years
but few intersection approaches had been so signed. In 1973 the Indiana
Legislature mandated R T O R by rule effective July 1, 1974.
P A S T R E SE A R C H F IN D IN G S
The matter of R T O R has been examined in many studies. Some
of these studies have been theoretical while others were reports of actual
field surveys.
Accident Studies
Almost all pertinent studies have come to the conclusion that R T O R
maneuver accidents are a very small portion of the total accident ex
perience. Some reports even indicated that the R T O R maneuver may
be safer than right turn on green. It also appears that pedestrians may
be safer with the R T O R maneuver than with right turn on green. Only
one study by M ay reported any increased accident experience with the
maneuver.7
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Vehicle Delay and Travel Time
It was found in several studies that delay to right turning vehicles
was reduced without increasing the delay for other vehicles at the inter
section. Also, it was found that travel time over a prescribed course
which included a right turn was reduced. This delay reduction varied
from 20.1 seconds to 9.7 seconds saved per right turning vehicle in
one of the studies. In another study it was found that the average
amount of time saved per vehicle appeared to be directly proportional
to the length of the red phase of the signal cycle in the case of twophase, fixed time signals. It was also determined that the presence or
number of pedestrians had no real effect on the amount of time saved
with use of the R T O R maneuver.
Gap Availability
M ost of the literature dealing with gaps concerned itself with the
size of gap which would be accepted for a R T O R maneuver. The size
of reported acceptable gaps for right turning vehicles ranged from a
minimum of 4.25 seconds to a median of 7.36 seconds. It was also
found that adequate acceptable gaps generally exist in pedestrian traffic
for right turning vehicles.
Capacity and Level of Service
A model was developed by one study to evaluate the R T O R
volumes resulting from the maneuver.18 When the equation was tested in
the field, it was found that it provided a reasonable estimate of the
maximum limit of R T O R maneuver volumes. It was found that the
use of the R T O R maneuver did not increase the total capacity of an
intersection, but that it could improve the level of service of an ap
proach if the cross-street was not operating at capacity.
Driver Compliance
A study by the Minnesota Department of Highways compared
driver performance under permission by signing and permission by rule
in the state of Minnesota.8 In general, the study found little difference
in R T O R rejection for the permission by sign and permission by rule
cases. There did appear to be more violations (illegal R T O R ) with
the rule case than for the sign case.
Warrants
A variety of warrants for use of the R T O R maneuver have been
used throughout the country. Almost all of these warrants were arbi
trary, and the application of them has been very subjective.
One warrant which generally has been long accepted is that the
R T O R maneuver should not be permitted where sight distance is in-
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adequate. Inherent with sight distance and the R T O R maneuver is
the fact than an acceptable gap for the maneuver must be visible if the
movement is to be made safely. W ork performed on gap acceptance by
Solberg and Oppenlander resulted in the conclusion that the median
acceptable gap for a right turning vehicle is approximately 7.36
seconds.16
F IR S T S T U D Y A T P U R D U E
Study Design
During 1973 and 1974 a research project on R T O R was performed
in the cities of Lafayette and Indianapolis in Indiana. This project was
directed toward developing warrants for prohibiting R T O R as the
new Indiana law required an engineering study at each intersection to
determine if R T O R should be prohibited under the R T O R by rule.
For the Lafayette study, the research objective was to determine
changes in levels of various intersection characteristics. A before and
after technique was used for measuring these changes. The before study
examined the approach legs of several intersections considered for
implementation of the maneuver. A R T O R sign was then installed at
each location. After a one-month period each approach was again
examined to measure any changes which had occurred.
T h e variables that were measured in this study w e r e :

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Number of phases per signal cycle.
Length of red phase.
Length of cycle.
Nature of cross traffic flow upstream.
Speed of cross traffic upstream.
Speed of approach traffic.
Volume of cross traffic upstream.
Volume of approach traffic.
Volume of pedestrians crossing approach street.
Number of through lanes of cross traffic upstream.
Percent of turning movements of cross traffic upstream.
Number of approach lanes.
Availability of right turn only lane.
Percent of right turn approach volume.
W idth of approach street.
Number of cross traffic lanes upstream.
Volume of left turn on opposite approach on separate phase.
Sight distance.
Pedestrian delay.
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20. Vehicle delay.
21. Accident potential.
A ll the measurements were taken on an hourly basis. Each inter
section was studied for four hours including both peak and nonpeak
periods during both the before and after studies. For the study, twelve
approaches at four intersections were selected. The dependent variables
consisted of pedestrian delay, delay savings to vehicles, accident po
tential, and volume changes.
A moving car technique was used to measure vehicle delay savings.
A vehicle was driven through the intersection making a right turn from
the study approach. Before entering the intersection, a stop watch was
started at a predetermined reference point. After traveling through the
intersection, the stop watch was stopped at a second predetermined
reference point. These reference points were selected in an arbitrary
manner, but attempts were made to select points located where the vehicle
had not started to slow down as it approached the intersection or was
not accelerating as it came away from the intersection. In the before
study, all turns were made against a green signal. In the after study,
the turns were made as soon as they could be made safely. Ten random
runs were made each hour in both the before and after studies. The
ten runs were averaged and the difference between the before and after
averages was taken to be the average delay reduction resulting from
the R T O R maneuver.
A critical incident method was used to measure accident potential.
The observer simply counted and recorded all defensive maneuvers by
drivers, such as a swerve or severe braking, which he felt resulted from
the driver attempting to avoid an accident. The count of these critical
maneuvers, or accident potential, was recorded for both the before and
after studies. The intent was to use the difference in these numbers,
with the appropriate traffic volumes taken into consideration, as the
relative change in accident expectation resulting from the R T O R
maneuver.
An attempt was also made to measure driver irritation resulting
from the R T O R maneuver. It was felt that some drivers would display
irritation when they were not able to make a right turn, because the
vehicle in front of them was in their way. This measurement was re
corded as the number of occurrences of any display of irritation such
as drivers sounding their horns.
As a measure of driver acceptance, the number of situations where
a vehicle making a right-turn had the opportunity to make it on red was
recorded. Also, the number of drivers actually making the R T O R
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maneuver was recorded. These counts permitted calculation of the
percent of drivers who made a R T O R maneuver when given the
opportunity.
Another study of R T O R vehicle effects was made at intersections
in Indianapolis, Indiana. In late 1968 the City of Indianapolis installed
signs permitting the R T O R maneuver at a large variety of intersections
under their jurisdiction. Since the maneuver had been permitted there
for approximately five years and the motoring public had a good op
portunity to become accustomed to it, a number of Indianapolis inter
sections were evaluated.
Thirty-six intersection approaches were examined. Some of the
intersections were near the C B D while others were in outlying areas.
A t each of the selected approaches, a four-hour study was made of
pedestrian delay, accident potential, R T O R maneuver opportunities
and use, and driver irritation. The data collected as measures of each of
these factors were the same as for the before and after study in Lafayette
except for pedestrian delay and accident potential. Rather than using
the change in pedestrian delay occurrences by type, it became necessary
(because of no before study) to simply use the number of pedestrian
delay occurrences by type resulting from an R T O R maneuver. Rather
than using the change in accident potential occurrences, it likewise
became necessary to use the number of accident potential occurrences
resulting from an R T O R maneuver.
It was further decided that a new dependent variable should be
considered in the study, the number of gaps in the cross traffic, as they
could be an important consideration for the R T O R maneuver. The
number of gaps was measured by observation at each site. An adequate
gap was recorded each time a gap large enough for one vehicle to make
a right turn was observed. If the gap was large enough for more than
one vehicle to turn, the number of vehicles which could have turned into
the gap in the cross traffic was recorded.
The study also analyzed the available accident records from 1967
through 1970 for each of the selected R T O R maneuver intersections.
A before and after study was performed to compare accident experiences
before R T O R sign installation (1967-68) and after its installation
(1969-70).
Accident Analysis
In the Lafayette study the accident data were too small to draw
an absolute conclusion. In the Indianapolis study the accident informa
tion at R T O R maneuver intersections was broken into the categories
of personal injury, property damage, and pedestrians. A before and
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after study was performed to determine the effect of the R T O R
maneuver on accidents.
In summary, it was concluded that the installation of R T O R
maneuver signs had very little effect on accident experience at R T O R
maneuver intersections. For personal injury accidents, the number of
personal injuries increased after the signs were installed, but the in
crease was not significant at an alpha level of .05. In a similar manner,
the number of property damage accidents decreased, but it also was not
a significant difference. The total number of accidents, however, sig
nificantly decreased after the signs were installed.
R T O R Usage
During both the Lafayette and Indianapolis studies, the number of
opportunities to perform a R T O R maneuver and the number of times
these opportunities were utilized were recorded. These data were
then used to compute the percent of the opportunities which were used.
An opportunity to perform a R T O R maneuver was considered to exist
when the first vehicle in the right curb lane desired to turn right while
facing a red traffic signal and an appropriate gap was available. It was
not considered to be a R T O R maneuver opportunity unless the vehicle
eventually turned right, either on the green or red signal indication.
The number of opportunities utilized were the opportunities when a
vehicle performed the right turn before the signal changed to green.
The number of R T O R maneuver opportunities ranged from a low
of no opportunities to a high of 174 opportunities per hour. The average
number of opportunities was 16 per hour. The number of R T O R
maneuvers performed ranged from a low of no maneuvers to a high
of 173 maneuvers per hour. The average number of maneuvers was eight
maneuvers per hour. The percentage of the R T O R maneuver oppor
tunities which were utilized ranged from a low of zero percent to a
high of 100 percent. The average percent utilized was 54.
Intersections approaches with cross traffic speed less than 35 miles
per hour were found to have a significantly higher percentage of use of
R T O R maneuver opportunities. Similarly intersection approaches with
cycle lengths less than 70 seconds, with only one lane on the cross
street, or with sight distance greater than 285 feet had significantly
greater percentage of use of the R T O R maneuver opportunities.
Delay Reduction
A portion of the Lafayette study was designed to examine the re
duction in vehicle delay to right turning vehicles at signalized inter
sections resulting from the R T O R maneuver. An average travel time
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for vehicles making right turns at each study approach was determined
for both the before and after studies. The delay reduction was taken to
be the difference between the average travel time before and the average
travel time after.
The reduced delay for the 12 approaches at the four intersections
used in the Lafayette study ranged in value from a low of minus .20
seconds (an increase in delay of .20 seconds), to a high of 15.23 seconds.
Ten intersection approaches out of 12 had significant delay reduction in
the after period.
Pedestrian Delay
Very few occurrences of pedestrian delays were observed. A total
of five pedestrians were forced to wait on the curb by a vehicle turning
right on a green signal. One other pedestrian was forced to wait in
the middle of the street by a vehicle turning right on a green signal.
N o pedestrian delays were observed during either the Lafayette study
or the Indianapolis study resulting from a R T O R maneuver.
Pedestrian volumes in the study ranged from zero to approximately
130 pedestrians per hour with the majority of the samples having ap
proximately 70 or less pedestrians per hour. It appeared that the R T O R
maneuver had no adverse effects on pedestrian travel for the pedestrian
volumes observed.
Driver Irritation
In both the Lafayette and Indianapolis studies, driver irritation
incidents were recorded. These irritation occurrences were any occur
rence which seemed to indicate that a driver desired the vehicle in
front of him to perform the R T O R maneuver. In the study, as expected,
the only form of driver irritation observed was a driver sounding his
horn.
In the Lafayette study, only eight incidents of driver irritation
were noted, and only seven occurrences were noted in the Indianapolis
study. These intersections had very few common characteristics, and it
appears that these occurrences were very random in nature.
SE C O N D S T U D Y A T P U R D U E
Study Design
During 1975 and 1976, after R T O R had been in operation in
Indiana by rule for one year, another study was performed in 18 cities.
The study was to determine how R T O R was being used in Indiana by
traffic officials and by motorists and how it affected accidents and traffic
flow.
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In the study, field observations were performed at 150 signalized
intersection approaches where R T O R was permitted. The characteristics
of each approach varied widely from one location to another. Several
variables were measured in order to determine their effect on the per
formance of the R T O R maneuver. The different variables that were
measured at each approach were as follows:
1. Number of vehicles which did not have the chance to turn on
red either because of the high approach traffic volume or be
cause of the high cross traffic volume.
2. Number of vehicles which refused to turn on red when they
had the chance to do so.
3. Number of vehicles which arrived on green.
4. Number of vehicles which turned on red and came to a full
stop or very low speed before turning.
5. Number of vehicles which turned on red and did not stop (or
slow to very slow speed) before turning.
6. Total traffic volume on the studied approach (including right
turning vehicles).
7. Total traffic volume approaching from the left (cross traffic).
8. Total cycle length.
9. Length of red phase.
10. Number of conflicts between R T O R vehicles and cross traffic.
The traffic conflict technique developed by General Motors Corpo
ration was used to measure traffic accident potential of R T O R ve
hicles.12 Previous use of this technique has shown it to be a potentially
valuable tool for the evaluation of intersection operation. It provides
significant data in a short testing period. Moreover, studies have shown
that conflicts and accidents are associated.1,10
For a meaningful evaluation of the R T O R maneuver it was be
lieved that the information which could be obtained from the traffic
conflict technique would be more reliable than that available from
accident history. Accident data may be inadequate, distorted, incorrect,
or incomplete, while traffic conflict studies use objective criteria to
obtain significant quantities of data in short observation periods.
Observation of conflicts was conducted during the same times as
observation for other data. Conflicts were observed from a vehicle
parked on the side of the roadway about 100 to 300 feet prior to the
intersection. (See Figures 1 and 2.) The vehicle faced the direction
of traffic movement and did not interfere with normal movements.
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Figure 1.

Right-Turn-on-Red Conflict (Braking)

Observations were conducted on weekdays with data collected at
both off-peak and peak hours. Off-peak hours were considered from
9 to 11 a.m. while peak hours were considered from 4 to 6 p.m. Results
were recorded after each observation hour for both off-peak and peak
periods.
Physical characteristics of the studied intersections that were con
sidered were:
1. Number of approach lanes.
2. Number of lanes of cross traffic upstream.
3. Availability of exclusive right turn lane.
4. Type of signal (progressive or nonprogressive).
5. City size. Cities of population more than 25,000 were considered
to be large while cities of less than 25,000 were considered to be
small.
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Figure 2.

Right-Turn-on-Red Conflict (Lane Change)

Attempts were made to observe the nature of conflict between
R T O R vehicles and pedestrians. Driver irritation was also observed in
the same way as in the first study.
Left turn on red from a one-way street to another one-way street
was also studied in a similar way as R T O R . Eight signalized inter
section approaches were observed.
This second study also determined how drivers complied with N O
T U R N O N R E D signs. Field studies were performed on a random
sample of 38 signalized intersection approaches in 12 cities in Indiana
where R T O R or L T O R was prohibited.
Right-Turn-on-Red Analysis
From the field observation data it was found that right turning
vehicles averaged 19.0 percent of the total approach traffic volume.
Total right turning vehicles were found to operate as shown below:
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Arrived on red:
R T O R vehicles
Vehicles that refused to turn on red
Vehicles that did not have the chance
to turn on red
Arrived on green

=
=

19.5%
10.1%

=
=

18.8%
51.6%

As calculated from the above data the percent of vehicles using
R T O R averaged only 3.7 percent of total approach traffic volume.
Analysis of variance tests were performed in order to determine the
significant factors affecting the performance of the R T O R maneuver.
Important factors that proved to be significant at a five percent level
of significance w ere:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

City size.
Number of approach lanes.
Availability of a right turn lane.
Approach traffic volume.
Cross traffic volume.
Percent of red signal time.

Averages of turning vehicles were calculated for the significant
factors noted above as follows with all values as percent of total right
turn vehicles:

Small Cities
Large Cities

% RTOR
15.6
21.3

One-lane Approach
Multilane Approach

1 1 .2

% RTOR
Available right
turn lane
No right turn lane

% Refused to Turn on Red
15.5
6.7
% Refused to Turn on Red

26.3
19.3

6.4
% N o Chance to Turn on Red

1 1 .2
2 2 .0

The type of signal also was important. The average percents of
R T O R vehicles classified according to signal type were as follows:

Progressive Signal
Nonprogessive Signal

% RTOR
11.3
2 1 .2

It was also concluded that the percent of R T O R vehicles increased
with a decrease of approach traffic volume and with a decrease of cross
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traffic volume. Percent of R T O R vehicles increased also with an
increase in the percent of red signal time. Percent of vehicles that
refused to make a R T O R increased significantly with a decrease of
the approach traffic volume. It was also found that percent of vehicles
that did not have the chance to make the R T O R maneuver increased
significantly with an increase of the approach traffic volume and with
an increase of the cross traffic volume.
During 600 hours of observation, 56 R T O R vehicles did not stop
or slow down to a low speed before turning. They represented 0.85
percent of the total R T O R vehicles.
Traffic Conflicts
During the 600 observation hours, 40 conflicts between R T O R
vehicles and the cross traffic were observed. The number of conflicts
did not exceed one or two per hour in any case while there were no
conflicts at all in most cases. None of the observed conflicts were serious
in nature.
The number of conflicts was observed to be higher when the traffic
volume in the cross direction was high and fast. Also, it was observed
that the number of conflicts was higher when the sight distance was
not adequate to make the R T O R movement. It was also observed
that the number of conflicts in large cities was higher than in small
cities.
In summary, the R T O R movement did not cause a significant
increase in the accident potential of the intersection. Although not
quantitatively evaluated, R T O R might actually decrease certain types
of traffic conflicts by clearing the intersection and expediting traffic
movement.
Pedestrians
During the data collection periods, R T O R vehicles did not cause
any new problems to pedestrians at the studied intersections. In almost
every case motorists yielded the right of way to the pedestrians before
turning. No unusual pedestrian delays were observed during the study
periods resulting from a R T O R maneuver.
Although R T O R vehicles may be in conflict with some pedestrians
crossing the approach, it should be noted that when vehicles turn on
green they will be in conflict with a substantial percentage of the
pedestrians in the cross street. As a result, pedestrian conflict with
vehicles is not increased by the R T O R maneuver as compared to
RTOG.
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Driver Irritation
Six horns were recorded during the 600 observation hours as an
indication of drivers desiring the vehicle in front of them to make a
R T O R movement. On the other hand, the R T O R movement reduced
driver irritation by preventing unnecessary delays. Many drivers proba
bly prefer to turn on red rather than be compelled to wait for the
green signal.
L eft Turn on Red
From the field observations it was found that L T O R vehicles aver
aged only 1.3 percent of the total left turning vehicles. This was about
0.26 percent of the total approach traffic volume. This was much less
than R T O R as the percent of drivers that refused the opportunity to
make a L T O R was much higher than the percent of drivers that re
fused the opportunity to make a R T O R .
During the data collection periods, all drivers that made the L T O R
maneuver came to a full stop or a rolling stop before turning. No
traffic conflicts between L T O R vehicles and vehicles approaching from
the right were recorded during the study period. Because of the very
small L T O R , this movement had a very small probability of increasing
the accident potential at signalized intersections. It was also observed
that all vehicles which made a L T O R yielded to pedestrians before
turning. No pedestrian delay of any kind was recorded due to the
maneuver.
Turn-on-Red Prohibition
According to the field surveys at the approaches where the R T O R
maneuver was prohibited, the number of violations ranged from zero
to four per hour. Percent violations ranged from a low of zero percent
to a high of ten percent of the total right turning vehicles. T h e average
percent of violations was 1.4 percent of the total vehicles that made a
right turn.
An attempt was made to determine the different factors that affected
the number of violations. It was concluded that the number of violations
increased when the approach traffic was heavy and the crossing traffic
was light.
Also, it was observed that the number of violations was affected by
the type of vehicle. The percent of motorcycles that turned on red
where the maneuver was prohibited was more than for other vehicles.
No R T O R violations were observed to be made by trucks at the studied
locations.
A study was performed to determine the effect of N O T U R N O N
R E D sign location on percent of violations. Most R T O R prohibition
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signs were post mounted at the corners of the intersections, while the
siganls were overhead mounted. This situation could result in the sign
being unnoticed. According to the data, however, no significant dif
ference in percent of R T O R violations was observed between the loca
tions where the sign was overhead mounted or post mounted.
Questionnaire on R T O R
One phase of the study included contact with traffic officials in the
state of Indiana to evaluate their appraisal after one year of the quality
of use of the R T O R maneuver in their city. In July 1975, a question
naire was sent to the traffic engineers, traffic officers, or chiefs of police
in all cities of Indiana. Replies were received from 74 cities distributed
throughout the state. Traffic officials in some larger communities in
Indiana were also interviewed to determine their utilization, including
warrants used, of R T O R .
The data obtained from the questionnaire were tested for com
pleteness and accuracy. The analysis of the answers indicated that the
number of signalized intersection approaches at which the maneuver
was prohibited ranged from zero to 83.1 percent of the total signalized
approaches in the city, with an average of 12.0 percent. This means
that the R T O R maneuver was permitted at 88 percent of the total
signalized intersection approaches in the state.
According to the answers received from traffic officials, the reasons
for R T O R prohibition and the average percent of the frequencies for
each reason are shown in Table 2.
TABLE 2

R EASO N S F O R N O T P E R M I T T I N G R T O R
ON AN APPROACH

Reason
Inadequate sight distance
Separate conflicting turning phase
Heavy pedestrian crossing
M ore than four approaches into the intersection
Heavy cross street traffic
School crossing
Others

Average ( % )
29
28
14
8
7
7
7

Twenty accidents attributed to R T O R movements during the one
year of history were reported by the questionnaire respondents. Eighteen
of these accidents occurred in large cities while only two accidents were
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reported from small cities. A ll these accidents involved only minor
property damages or minor injuries. No fatalities or serious injuries
were reported in responses to the questionnaire. Most accidents were
reported to have been caused by vehicles which did not come to a full
stop before turning and proceeded into the intersection without yielding
the right-of-way to the cross traffic. Only two of these accidents were
classified as pedestrian accidents. They were reported in large cities
during peak hours. These two accidents also occurred due to the drivers’
failure to come to a complete stop before turning. It was noted that
some of the reported R T O R accidents could be attributed to the poor
design of the intersection or because of allowing R T O R at locations
where it should be prohibited.
Most traffic officials in Indiana were in favor of allowing the R T O R
as a basic rule because it tends to decrease the delay and improve the
level of service at signalized intersections. The only problem reported
was that some drivers do not come to a full stop before turning.
F IN D IN G S A N D C O N C L U S IO N S
From the analysis of the data in these two research projects, certain
observations and findings were made. These observations and findings
are summarized below:
1. It was found that there was no increase in the total number of
accidents after allowing the R T O R maneuver. Collision dia
grams prepared from the accident data indicated that very few
pedestrian accidents involved a R T O R maneuver.
It was observed that no pedestrians were placed in a more
hazardous situation because of a R T O R maneuver during any
of the data collection periods. Further, not a single instance of
pedestrian delay caused by a R T O R maneuver vehicle was ob
served.
2. Delay reduction to right turning vehicles resulting from the
R T O R maneuver was found. The amount of average delay
reduction was found to vary from intersection approach to
intersection approach, depending on length of red time on the
approach, and varied from no reduction to as much as 15
seconds per right turning vehicle that used the R T O R maneuver.
3. Very little driver irritation was found with the R T O R maneu
ver, even in locations where it had been recently implemented.
The only form witnessed was an occasional horn-blowing by a
stopped following vehicle. Such notice to the driver ahead almost
never resulted in his utilization of the R T O R maneuver.
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4. Under the R T O R by rule the R T O R maneuver was made by
an average of only 19.5 percent of the total right turning ve
hicles. This is 3.7 percent of the total approach volume.
5. Important factors that proved to have significant effects on the
R T O R maneuver w ere:
a. City size; the percent of R T O R vehicles was 21.3 percent
of the total right turning vehicles in large cities while it
was 15.6 percent in small cities. Consequently, the percent
of vehicles that refused the opportunity to turn on red in
large cities was smaller than in small cities.
b. Number of approach lanes; it was found that percent of
drivers refusing the opportunity to turn on red was higher
on one-lane approaches than on multilane approaches.
c. An exclusive right turn lane; it was found that R T O R ve
hicles were 26.3 percent of the total right turning vehicles
when a right turn lane was available, while this percent was
19.3 percent when there was not a right turn lane.
6. The percent of R T O R vehicles increased significantly with a
decrease of the approach traffic volume and also with a decrease
of the cross traffic volume.
7. The number of traffic conflicts between R T O R vehicles and
the cross traffic was very small and did not cause any serious
problems.
8. The L T O R maneuver was used by only 1.3 percent of the
total left turning vehicles (0.26 percent of the total approach
volume).
9. The percent of vehicles that made a R T O R at locations where
the maneuver was prohibited was 1.4 percent of the total right
turning vehicles.
10. Although a small number of vehicles did not come to a full
stop (or slow to a very slow speed) before turning on red, they
did not create major problems in the performance of the maneu
ver.
11. According to answers to a questionnaire that were received
from the traffic officials in cities of Indiana, the R T O R maneuver
was operating efficiently. The maneuver was allowed at 88 per
cent of all signalized intersection approaches in these cities. Most
traffic officials are in favor of allowing the maneuver. Twenty
R T O R accidents were reported in the questionnaire; however,
they involved only minor property damages or minor injuries.
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12. Problems that resulted from allowing the R T O R maneuver
were:
a. Some R T O R vehicles do not come to a full stop before turn
ing.
b. Confusion occurs because all states do not have a uniform
law concerning the maneuver.
c. Some drivers refuse to turn on red when they have the
chance to do so.
13. On the basis of the findings of these studies and experience
indicated in the literature warrants were suggested. These war
rants were slightly revised by the Indiana State Highway Com
mission after further experience and are subdivided into three
groups:
A.

T U R N S O N R E D should be prohibited for safety reasons
where:
1. Minimum sight distance of cross street traffic as shown
in the following table, is not available to the potential
T U R N O N R E D motorist:
M I N I M U M S IG H T D IS T A N C E
Speed of Cross
Street Traffic
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55

Sight Distance
In Feet (Approx.)
220
270
330
380
430
490
540
600

Minimum sight distance should be measured from the
drivers position with the vehicle at a point immediately
prior to entry into the intersecting street. Where pedes
trian signals are in place, the sight distance should be
measured from the driver’s position with the vehicle
at the S T O P L IN E or, if none, the C R O S S W A L K
location. The engineering investigation should include
an estimate of the approach speed of the crossing traffic
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since these speeds may be more or less than the posted
speed.
2. A separate signal phase for a turning movement of
which the T U R N O N R E D motorist may be unaware
exists at the intersection, and which could conflict with
a T U R N O N R E D movement; except when engineer
ing investigations reveal that one of the following modi
fications to this warrant would be appropriate.
(a) The warrants and need for the L E F T T U R N
A R R O W should be considered and if the arrow
is not warranted or is of minimum need, the arrow
should be removed, and the T U R N O N RED
permitted.
(b ) When the left turn movement is fully warranted
and made under a L E F T T U R N O N A R R O W
O N L Y situation, the conflicting R I G H T T U R N
O N RED maneuver should be prohibited; how
ever, when two or more lanes are available to
receive the turning vehicles, the T U R N O N RE D
movement should be considered along with the
volumes of the respective turns and the lane widths
involved. A minimum width of 11 feet is normally
considered to be adequate for a lane.
(c) Where only one exiting lane is available to receive
the turning vehicles or where double lane left
turn movements are permitted, the conflicting
T U R N O N R E D maneuver should be prohibited;
however, the movement may be permitted in special
cases involving one-way streets and one-way inter
change ramps where conflicts are minimal.
3. The intersection has more than four approaches. At
such locations cross street traffic which conflicts with the
T U R N O N RE D may not be quickly identified by
the T U R N O N R E D motorist or the T U R N O N
R E D motorist may be able to turn into more than one
street, thus creating u n ex p ected conflicts. However,
T U R N O N R E D maneuvers may be allowed at multi
legged intersections when it is apparent that no un
expected conflicts would be involved as, for example,
when the use of O N E -W A Y streets would preclude
traffic conflicts; where special channelization is in place;
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or where signal phasing is of such nature that conflicts
are minimal.
B.

T U R N S O N R E D may be prohibited because of little
benefit from the maneuver at locations where:
1. There is a very short R E D time for the approach;
2. Cross street traffic is heavy for many hours of the signaloperating day (where the cross street is operating at
capacity for almost all hours of the signal-operating
day) ;
3. Pedestrian use of the crosswalk on the approach street
is heavy for almost all hours of the signal-operating
day;
4. Little right-turn demand exists and there is no R IG H T
T U R N O N L Y lane available.

C.

T U R N S O N R E D may be prohibited because of possible
adverse public reaction where:
1. A school crossing route passes through the intersection;
2. There are moderate to high pedestrian volumes.
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